The k=1000 SPO poll
Should stakePoolTargetNum (k) be raised from 500 to 1000? (SPO poll)
gov_action17m7nv7839mw93hv889tqzj0umv9ckm780f0nq02fep78f50uedxqq6g5mt9In plain English
This is an info action: an on-chain poll. It asks stake pool operators whether there's enough support to bring a later, separate proposal to raise the parameter k (stakePoolTargetNum) from 500 to 1000.
k sets the point at which a pool is 'saturated'. At k=500 that's 1/500 (0.2%) of circulating ADA; at k=1000 it would be 1/1000 (0.1%). Stake above a pool's saturation point doesn't earn extra rewards, so a lower point pushes stake to spread across more pools.
The poll does not change anything on chain. If SPOs signal support, someone would still need to submit a Parameter Change action, which DReps and the Constitutional Committee would then vote on.
Outcome: voting closed at the epoch 663 boundary (Oct 21, 2026). Final Koios tally: SPOs 26 yes / 48 no / 1 abstain, so Yes was 2.21% of active SPO stake against the poll's own >50% test (about 9.9% among pools that voted Yes or No). DReps, whose votes don't count toward the SPO mandate, finished 44 yes / 38 no / 49 abstain (7.78% yes). CC: 1 yes, 1 abstain. As an info action, it changes nothing on chain.
Who it affects
- Large pools and multi-pool operators would hit saturation sooner, so some stake would need to move or be split across more pools.
- Delegators in pools that end up above the new saturation point could see lower rewards until they move.
- Smaller pools could have more delegation available to them, though rationales on both sides disagree about how much would actually reach them.
- Nothing changes from this poll by itself.
Where the vote stands
Snapshot: Koios, Oct 23, 2026, 05:58 UTC, epoch 663, block 14,104,384
| Voting body | Yes | No | Abstain | Yes % of stake |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DReps | 44 | 38 | 49 | 7.78% |
| SPOs | 26 | 48 | 1 | 2.21% |
| Constitutional Committee | 1 / 7 | 0 / 7 | 1 / 7 | — |
Final. DReps were invited to vote, but the proposal says DRep votes don't count toward the SPO mandate. Among DReps who voted Yes or No, Yes was about 17.3% of stake (₳258.81M yes vs ₳1,239.92M no).
Final. By the poll's own test, Yes was 2.21% of active SPO stake (registered stake that didn't vote counts as No). Among pools that voted Yes or No, Yes was about 9.9% of stake (₳210.48M yes vs ₳1,906.44M no).
Counts are votes cast; percentages are stake-weighted, per CIP-1694.
What it needs to pass
- Under CIP-1694, info actions can never be ratified (their formal threshold is 100%), so this poll can't 'pass' on chain. It only records a signal.
- The proposal's own test: SPO support counts as established only if explicit SPO Yes votes are more than 50% of active SPO voting stake. Explicit Abstain is excluded; registered stake that doesn't vote counts as No.
- DRep votes are recorded but, by the proposal's own terms, don't count toward the SPO mandate.
- Actually changing k would need a separate Parameter Change action. k is in the technical parameter group, so that needs at least 67% of DRep stake plus Constitutional Committee approval.
- Votes cast before the start of epoch 663 (Oct 21, 2026, 21:44 UTC) are the last that can count. After that the poll expires.
Arguments for / against
We don't take sides. These are verbatim excerpts from published vote rationales and the proposal document. Follow the links to read them in full.
The case for
“A K change is long overdue. Unfortunately, A0 is still not fixed. Still voting yes as this is better late than never, but A0 solutions, minimum margin, and a K change should have been implemented by now.”
“Distributing stake and block production opportunities across a greater number of pools is valuable. Even when existing operators split their pools, this can still represent progress in pool-level decentralization…”
“Not because k=1000 is already proven to be the correct parameter, but because getting a clean, current, stake-weighted SPO mandate on that specific question is valuable information and a sensible prerequisite to the actual parameter vote.”
The case against
“I share the goal of more independent operators, but raising k doesn’t reach them. It cuts rewards for delegators in ~200 established pools and operators can just open more pools, as happened last time. Better-targeted measures exist.”
“Raising k to 1000 would not create new independent operators, as large entities can simply split stake across more pool IDs, while established community pools that built their delegation over years would be penalised.”
“An isolated increase of k to 1000 will likely only drive the growth of multi-pools by large entities. Furthermore, the fixed fee will reduce delegator ROS for mid-sized pools. Changes to economic parameters must be implemented holistically.”
“What empirical evidence demonstrates that doubling K will increase the number of economically sustainable, independently controlled stake pool operators rather than simply incentivize existing multi-pool operators to split their infrastructure?”
Excerpts are taken verbatim from rationales attached to on-chain votes; follow the links to read them in full. The last one is an Abstain vote that raises an open question.